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1One of the clearest trends in asset management is the rapid increase in the amount of individual
and institutional money invested in indexed products.  By far the most popular index which investors
want to replicate is the S&P 500 index.  While many academic studies have examined the
characteristics of two instruments frequently used to replicate the S&P, index funds and futures, very
little has been written about the newest way to replicate the S&P 500 index: Standard and Poors
Depository Receipts (SDPR) commonly referred to as Spiders.  The importance of Spiders can be
seen by the fact that at the end of 1999 there were 19.8 billion dollars invested in Spiders and that in
1998 daily shares traded in Spiders exceeded any other stock except Compaq and daily dollar volume
was the highest of any share traded.  This is all the more surprising given the fact that Spiders have not
been around very long.
There are three major reasons why this analysis is useful. First, the principal advantage of
Spiders versus index funds is that they can be purchased and sold at prices which exist at any time
during the trading day.  As we will show, low-cost index funds produce higher returns than Spiders.
Given that investors can use either vehicle, the difference in return gives a measure of the value of
immediacy. The value of immediacy is an important issue in the literature on market microstructure.
Second, since Spiders have become an important investment vehicle in terms of both trading volume
and dollar value outstanding, their performance and characteristics are of interest by themselves. Third,
the organizational form of Spiders is seen as the prototype for index funds of the future, and thus it is
1 There are several circumstances, none of which in our judgement is ever remotely likely, that cause the 
trust to dissolve earlier.
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important to understand both their performance and the affect of the organizational structure on that
performance.
  Before analyzing Spiders, we will briefly review their history and important characteristics. 
Each Spider represents an ownership interest in the SPDR Trust.  The Trust as stated in the prospectus
holds all of the common stocks in the S&P 500 composite stock price index and is intended to provide
investment results that, before expenses, generally correspond to the price and yield performance of the
S&P 500 Index.  Spiders are traded on the American Stock Exchange and can be bought and sold like
any stock at any time during the day.  One Spider has a price equal to approximately 1/10 of the price
of the S&P Index.  The initial deposit creating Spiders was made on January 22, 1993.  The Spider
was organized as an investment trust and has a mandatory termination date of January 22, 22181.  Any
trust is governed by a trust agreement and there are certain aspects of the trust agreement governing
Spiders which are important to understand.  First, Spiders charge an expense ratio to holders of the
Spider.  This has historically been 18.45  basis points per annum.  Second, a specific mechanism exists
for changing the number of Spiders outstanding.  Investors can create or delete Spiders in minimum
units of 50,000 shares by engaging in transactions in kind plus getting or receiving certain sums of cash. 
For example, investors can turn in a bundle of stock matching the S&P Index plus cash equal to the
accumulated dividends less management expenses and receive Spiders in return.  Investors can do so
for a payment of $3,000 (regardless of the size of the transaction).
3There is another peculiar aspect of Spiders that arises from their organizational form.  Spiders
pay out the dividends the trust receives on the stocks that it holds quarterly; on the last business days of
April, July, October and January (though the ex-dividend day of the trust occurs in the previous month). 
What is unusual is that the dividends the trust receives from the underlying stock is held in a non-earning
account between the time it is received and the time it is paid out.  
Having provided background on Spiders, we turn to the purpose of this article:  to study the
performance of Spiders and to compare Spiders with other methods of indexing.  This paper proceeds
as follows: In the first section we examine the performance of Spiders as an investment vehicle. We
start by examining the return from holding Spiders compared with the return from holding the S&P
Index. In this section we first examine Spider returns as if Spiders could be bought and sold at their net
asset value.  We then examine the magnitude and time path of the differences between Spider price and
NAV. Since Spiders are not the only way of holding an index, we next compare the return on Spiders
with the return on other methods of indexing, index funds and futures. One of the unique aspects of
Spiders is the ability of investors to create and delete them by turning in or receiving bundles of
securities. We briefly examine this phenomenon in Section II of this paper. The third and last section
examines the determinants of volume in Spider trading. The determinants of volume provide us with
insight into who is trading Spiders, and why. 
2We show later that differences between price and NAV are small and extremely short-
lived.
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I. Performance of Spiders
The purpose of this section is to examine the return on Spiders to see if they appear to be a
reasonable investment instrument. Since a Spider has its basic value determined by the S&P Index, we
will compare the return on Spiders to the return on the S&P Index and then try to decompose any
differences in return to see what accounts for them.  In what follows, we break Spider return into two
components: the return due to changes in NAV and the return due to deviations of NAV from price. 
This decomposition allows us to estimate return without having it depend on deviations that occurred at
a particular point in time.  Over long periods the difference between price and NAV is unimportant
because, through the ability to create and delete Spiders, arbitrage limits deviations.  For example, over
our sample period the average annual return from holding Spiders was 21.91% while the return on
NAV was 21.89%.2  After examining overall return we will examine the reasons Spider returns differ
from the S&P index.  Later we will compare Spiders to other instruments whose  performance is also
directly related to the S&P Index.
A. Overall Return on Spiders
We begin our analysis by examining the overall return an investor could have earned from
holding Spiders if Spiders were purchased and sold at their net asset value (NAV). It is important to
3 1993 is a partial year. Throughout, when we refer to 1993 return it is from February 1,
1993 to the end of the year.
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note that the NAV of a Spider is equal to the market value of the securities which back the Spider plus
an accumulation unit which is equal to accumulated dividends minus accumulated management fees.
Later we will examine the impact on return of deviations of Spider price from NAV.
In Table 1 we report the NAV return from holding a Spider for each year from 1993-1998.3
Since we are interested in total return, we computed return as change in NAV plus dividends paid to
the Spider holder, all divided by NAV. The yearly return was computed by first computing daily returns
and then compounding up to the yearly return. Cash payments to holders of the Spiders are assumed
reinvested in the Spider on the payment date.
The first step is to compare these returns to the returns on the S&P Index with dividends
reinvested daily. This left us with a problem: to estimate return on the S&P Index we had to estimate
both the daily dividends and  the price level of the S&P Index. Dividends were estimated by taking the
daily dividends for the S&P Index computed by CRSP. To compute prices we considered two
alternatives. One was simply to use the value (price) of the S&P Index computed by Standard &
Poors. This is the official measure of the S&P Index and is the value that any investor will see reported
in a public source. The second possible value is that reported by CRSP. The two values can be
different because of differences in pricing or weighting of the component stocks. Prices can differ
because of different treatment of the stocks where prices are not available (non-trading) or where
multiple prices are available. Weighting can differ where when- issued-stocks exist, or where mergers
6or acquisitions are taking place, or because of different recognition of capital changes (such as new
issues or stock dividends). While the Index value computed by S&P seems appropriate because this is
the price most investors will look at when considering investment or arbitrage, the index value reported
by CRSP might or might not be closer to the price at which investors can complete transactions in
attempting to duplicate the S&P Index.
We will perform our analysis in terms of both index values for the time being. Later we will
examine differences in more detail. We shall refer to returns based on the commonly reported S&P
Index as standard S&P returns while those based on the CRSP data as CRSP S&P returns.
When we examine the standard definition of S&P return with dividends (Section A of Table 1),
we see that on average the NAV return underperforms the S&P return by 28 basis points per year
(column 6). The NAV is outperformed in every year and the yearly range of outperformance is 17 to
36 basis points. Comparison with the CRSP S&P Index (Section B) shows a larger discrepancy. The
average underperformance of the NAV return is 40 basis points a year, and the range is from 5 to 71
basis points. The return earned on the assets by holders of Spiders are clearly smaller than the returns
on the indexes. What can account for these differences?
(INSERT TABLE 1)
1. Cost Disadvantages of Spiders
It is obvious that Spiders have certain cost disadvantages relative to the indexes. First there is
an amount for management expenses, including management fee which is charged every day. The
4 The expense ratio is frequently reported as 18 basis points because for many purposes
it is legally acceptable to round to the nearest whole basis point.  The expense ratio has
recently been lowered to 12 basis points.
5 Spiders offer investors a direct reinvestment plan. This plan allows the holders to have
the firm that underwrites Spiders hold and reinvest dividends. However, all of these
transaction costs should be low, as turnover in the portfolio amounts to only about 4%
per year.  
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expense ratio on Spiders is 18.45 basis points per year.4 Second, the dividends received from the
underlying stock are not reinvested, but rather are held in a non-interest-bearing account.  Next,
Spiders also have their return reduced by the transaction costs they incur in replicating the index. While
the Spiders do not have transaction costs due to cash inflows or outflows associated with the purchase
or sale of Spiders, they do have transaction costs associated with changing their portfolio when the
index changes and transaction costs associated with investors directly reinvesting their dividends.5
In addition to the cost disadvantages just mentioned, Spiders might underperform the index
because of poor replication strategies. It is possible that at every point of time the stocks held by the
Spider do not exactly match (in proportion) the stocks in the S&P Index. While at most times
composition is very close, if not exact, around the time of a change in the Index purchase and sales 
might not exactly match the pattern assumed in constructing the Index. The transaction costs of
purchase and sale, replication strategy and any inaccuracies in the reported index are considered
tracking error, and we will begin our examination of the reasons for underperformance by examining it.
2. Tracking Error
The difference in performance due to tracking error is easy to estimate. By taking the NAV
return, subtracting dividends paid on the underlying stocks and adding back management expenses, we
8have the return-based entirely on price changes on the Spiders underlying portfolio. This can be directly
compared with the price return on the S&P index and is free of management expenses and lost revenue
due to holding the dividends in a non-interest-bearing account.
When we examine the return on the NAV of a Spider based solely on price changes of its
underlying portfolio and compare it with the price return on the standard S&P Index (columns 4 and 5),
we find almost no difference (column 7, Section A, Table 1). On average, the NAV price return and
the return on the standard S&P index are the same. The range is from -6 basis points to +8 basis points
per year, with four years positive and two years negative. It appears that against the S&P Price Index
the shortfall is very close to zero. Failure to exactly hold the Index is as likely to lead to superior
performance as to inferior performance, and over any period could be plus or minus. The net of
transaction costs, any missed capital changes by S&P, and mismatching are quite small, and the total
effect of all of these influences leads to virtually no difference.
When we compare the NAV price return with the CRSP S&P price index, we get very
different results. The tracking error appears to lead to large underperformance. The average
underperformance is 11 basis points per year. Which of these indexes better reflects the Spider
performance? It would be surprising that with an average turnover of 4%, that transaction costs and
mismatching could result in an 11 bp underperformance. Thus the standard S&P Index seems the more
appropriate benchmark.  However, as a further check we investigated the day-to-day tracking
performance of the two indexes.  We investigated which index better tracked the Spider by regressing
the Spider NAV return against each index and the other index orthogonalized to the first. To do so, we
9first ran a regression using daily data of the NAV return on Spiders, excluding dividends and with
management expenses added back against the price return on the standard S&P Index, and the CRSP
S&P Index with the effect of the standard S&P Index removed (Panel B of Table 2).  We then ran a
regression of Spider NAV return against the CRSP S&P price Index and the standard S&P price
Index with the effect of the CRSP removed (Panel C of Table 2).  Note that when the standard S&P
Index is used along with the CRSP S&P Index orthogonalized to the S&P Index, the orthogonalized
CRSP S&P Index is not statistically significant at the 10% level. However, when the CRSP S&P Index
is used along with the S&P Index orthogonalized to the CRSP S&P Index, the orthogonalized S&P
Index is significant at the 1% level. These results support the fact that Spiders track the standard S&P
Index much closer than they track the CRSP Index. As a further test of this we selected the three
largest S&P Index funds as of 1999. These were Vanguard, Fidelity Spartan and T. Rowe Price. We
collected daily return data and ran the same two regressions using the daily return on each index fund as
the dependent variable. The results for the three funds are also shown in Table 2. Note that like
Spiders, the standard S&P Index appears to explain index fund returns better than the CRSP version of
the S&P Index. Since the investor can purchase or sell the standard S&P Index by putting money into
or taking money out of the S&P Index funds, the standard S&P Index seems to be a better benchmark
for Spiders. The difference in return due to tracking error is close to zero when the more appropriate
definition of the S&P Index is used.
TABLE 2 HERE
6 When we subtract out the difference due to tracking error from the total
difference in NAV total return, we find the results are virtually identical whether we use
the standard S&P Index or the CRSP S&P Index (see column 8 of Table 1).
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3. Other Sources of Underperformance
If tracking error doesn=t account for the underperformance of Spiders relative to the standard
S&P Index, what does?6 Of the 28.4 basis points underperformance, clearly 18.45 basis points is due
to the expense ratio charged against the return each year. The remaining difference, 9.95 basis points, is
due to the return shortfall caused by putting dividends in a non-interest-bearing account. The
reasonableness of this number can be seen by examining dividends and returns.  The prospectus shows
that the dividend yield was about 2.2% per year. Realizing that dividends are paid once a quarter and
that dividends can occur any time over the quarter, the investor loses the market rate of return for an
average of 12 months. However, the loss is even greater than this for dividends are not paid to the
holders of Spiders for approximately one month after the ex-dividend date. This makes the appropriate
loss two and one-half 12ths of the annual return. During the time period of this study the rate of return
on the S&P Index was about 22.2%. Thus the loss due to not reinvesting the dividends on the
underlying stock in the index at the time they were received was approximately 10.2 basis points. This
is very close to our direct estimate of 9.95 basis points obtained by examining the underperformance of
Spiders directly.  
7 This difference overstates the true difference because Spiders continue to trade 15
minutes after the New York Stock Exchange closes, and therefore NAV and price differ in time by 15
minutes.
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 As a further check on our statement that the underperformance is due to non-reinvestment of
dividends we computed the underperformance each quarter.  The amount of underperformance due to
not reinvesting the dividends should depend on the performance of the S&P Index in each quarter.  In
the four quarters where the S&P had negative performance the Spider outperformed the index (since
holding dividends in cash rather than reinvesting them is optimal when the market declines).  In Table 3,
we divide all quarters into 6 groups on the basis of return on the S&P Index (from low to high) and
report the return from the Spider minus return on the S&P Index.  The higher the return on the S&P
Index in any quarter, the worse the relative performance of Spiders in that quarter.  As a final check we
regressed the difference in performance of the S&P and Spiders on the performance of the S&P Index
and the  was .99.  The underperformance of Spiders is clearly related to the opportunity cost ofR2
not reinvesting dividends.
INSERT TABLE 3
B. Deviations of Price from NAV
In the prior section we assumed that all purchases and sales occurred at NAV. However, the
Spider price can deviate from NAV and this represents both a cost and opportunity to the investor.
Table 4 shows the distribution using closing prices of both the dollar difference between price
and NAV and the percentage difference expressed as the dollar difference divided by the  NAV.7 On
8 This means on average, price returns are slightly higher than NAV returns. Over the full
period this resulted in a 2 bp difference.
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average, price lies below NAV by 1.44 or .018%.8 In most cases the difference is small. Only about
5% of the cases have absolute dollar differences greater than 254, and less than 4% have percentage
differences above .35%. Less than 1% are above 504 or above .5%. About 70% of the time the
difference is within 1/8 of a dollar.
While the fact that deviations of price from NAV are small at any moment in time is important,
at least of equal significance is the persistence or lack of persistence of these deviations. To investigate
this we first defined a variable Dt as the difference between  price and NAV expressed in cents at the
close of day t. We then regressed the value of D at t+1 against the value of D of t. The results are
shown below.
 
D Rt + = =1
2 004 -1.34   +.0620D        
              (3.68)   (2.39)
t .
The results strongly support the fact that deviations of price and NAV disappear in a day. The
R2 and the slope of the regression coefficient are both close to zero.  What makes the premium or
discount disappear? Differences between NAV and price should signal an arbitrage opportunity and the
price pressure associated with the arbitrage should cause the deviation to disappear.
In Section III we show that there is a statistically significant relationship between volume and
the size of the discount or premium at the close of the previous day. This supports the hypothesis that
arbitrage between the Spider and the stocks which back the Spider accounts for the disappearance of
13
the premium on a daily basis. The ability to create and destroy Spiders acts as a very effective
mechanism in keeping price close to NAV at any moment in time and assuring that any differences
between the two disappear quickly.
INSERT TABLE 4
C. Comparison to Alternative Vehicles
In addition to the possibility of holding the shares that comprise the S&P Index directly or
holding Spiders, investors can approximate the return on an index by holding an index fund or by
holding short-term debt instruments and an index future. These alternatives will be examined in turn.
1. Index Funds
An individual investor had a wide selection of S&P Index funds from which to choose.
Morningstar lists over 100 index funds and over 50% of these are intended to track the S&P Index. In
selecting among these S&P Index funds, there are two considerations: how well the index funds track
the S&P, and the amount of the shortfall in return. There is very little difference in tracking error across
most open-end S&P index funds with the typical R2 on the S&P Index above .99. Differences in
average performance are primarily related to differences in expenses. Because it has low expenses, we
will use the Vanguard Index Fund as a comparison vehicle for Spiders. However, our analysis can be
applied to any fund.  
Relative performance of an index fund compared to the index itself and Spiders is affected by a
number of factors. The first is costs. Mutual funds have a number of costs that reduce performance. An
index fund pays management fees and other expenses that lower performance. In the case of Vanguard,
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the total fees are approximately 18 basis points per year for individuals, and either 6 basis point or 2.5
basis points for institutions depending on the size of the investment. The fees paid by individuals are
very close to the annual fees paid by investors in Spiders. In addition, an index fund pays transaction
costs every time it buys and sells a stock. Security transactions may be generated when investors place
more money with the fund or withdraw money, when the composition of the index is changed or when
investors reinvest dividends. This is an area where Spiders have a potential advantage, since new
investment or disinvestment is done in kind. In addition, an indirect cost may be borne by the index
funds as they need to keep cash on hand to meet withdrawals. This can in part be mitigated by the use
of futures, an instrument not available to Spiders. The second factor affecting relative performance is the
way index funds adjust their holdings for changes in the composition of the index. They can differ in the
way they react to tender offers and other capital changes. Also, they can differ in the timing of
adjustments of their portfolio to deal with changes in the S&P 500 Index. The third factor affecting
relative performance is security lending. Index funds can, and do, earn extra return by lending their
securities for the purpose of short selling, while Spiders do not. The fourth factor affecting relative
performance is the treatment of dividends. We know that Spiders underperform the index by about 10
basis points per year because of their requirement to hold dividends received from the underlying
stocks in a non-interest-bearing account. In contrast, index funds can reinvest dividends as soon as they
are received by the fund.
How do all these influences net out? Over the period 1994 to 1998 the Vanguard Index Fund
available to individual investors underperformed the standard S&P Index by 10 basis points per year,
9 Over time the underperformance of Vanguard relative to the index has been going
down.  The reader should note that after our sample period the expense ratio on Spiders was lowered
to twelve bases points.
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but outperformed Spiders by 18.1 basis points.9 The Vanguard institutional fund performed 12 to 15.5
basis points better than the Vanguard  fund available to individuals, depending on the size of the
institution=s investment and thus the fees it payed. These differences are calculated pre-tax. If we
include taxes, there is one further possible difference. Capital gains taxes are generated when capital
gains are realized. Capital gains are realized when the index is changed and for index funds potentially if
there are net withdrawals. Capital gains generated by net withdrawals should be small, since often they
are covered by cash balances and the fund can sell off shares purchased at the highest price. The effect
of index changes depends on the average purchase price of the security being sold. Age of fund is
probably a reasonable proxy for this. Thus, initially Spiders have an advantage since the shares they
hold were purchased more recently.
A major difference between index funds and Spiders is that Spiders can be sold intra-day.
What does the prior say about the value of immediacy? For individual investors the index fund has a
performance of pre-tax 18.1 basis points better than Spiders. Thus sophisticated investors in Spiders
are valuing immediacy as if it is worth at least 18 basis points per year. We state this as Aat least@
because the investors in Spiders incur additional transaction cost associated with buying and selling the
Spider, while transactions in the Vanguard index fund are at net asset value without commissions.
10 We used the standard techniques for estimating the implied S&P price from the futures
price.  For example, see Elton and Gruber (1995), equation 21.3, page 626 . We used the commercial
paper rate because this is the rate arbitragers use in valuing futures.
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2. Futures
The other alternative to a Spider is holding short-term money market instruments plus S&P
futures contracts. If the futures contracts sold for their arbitrage value, then this strategy should generate
returns equal to the true S&P return less the transaction costs of purchasing the future. In general,
results are better since usually the implicit price of the S&P Index embedded in the future is low relative
to the spot price of the Index. We estimate the implicit price of the S&P Index embedded in the futures
price using closing prices and daily calculation of dividends. The implicit price requires an estimate of
the dividend on the index. We assumed perfect forecasting. We took the daily dividends as reported by
CRSP as our estimate of the forecasted dividends. We discounted dividends at the commercial paper
rate. These resulted in the percentage difference between the S&P 500 Index and price of the S&P
implied by the futures price (expressed as a percentage of the S&P Index) of .027%10.  If an investor
bought futures and the associated short-term instrument at the average difference between the futures
price and arbitrage price, the result should be an outperformance of the S&P index by this 2.7 basis
points. If higher yield short-term instruments were used, this performance could be further increased.  If
we compare the return from futures with Spiders, futures have an added return of 30.7 basis points per
year.  However, futures generally involve too large of an investment for individual investors to use these
to construct index positions.  Furthermore, many institutions cannot own futures or choose not to own
futures.  The use of futures also involves a certain amount of expertise in forecasting dividends, in
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estimating correct positions, and in satisfying margin requirements. These reasons explain why the
demand for Spiders can continue to grow despite the return advantages of futures.  
Before leaving this section, it is worthwhile to examine the relationship of price changes in
Spiders to price changes in the S&P Index implicit in futures. To examine this we regressed the change
in the Spider price minus accumulations against the change in the implicit value of the S&P index
embedded in the futures price. The adjusted R2 was .98 with a slope coefficient of .99; thus Spiders
and futures prices move closely together.
II Creation/Deletion
As discussed earlier, one of the unique features of Spiders is that they can be created and
deleted.  It is time to examine this attribute of Spiders more closely.  Investors can create Spiders by
turning in the shares that comprise the index plus an amount of cash equal to the accumulation unit
(accumulated dividends and capital gains, less expenses). The amount of shares and the cash required
are based on closing prices and are electronically posted. Orders to create are in minimums of 50,000
Spiders and need to be placed before close. Likewise, Spiders can be deleted by turning in Spiders
(with a minimum amount of 50,000 shares) and receiving the stock shares that comprise the index plus
an accumulation unit. The process of creation and deletion has meant that as discussed earlier, price
and NAV are close.
Table 5 shows data on creation and deletion. Net creations or deletions occur on
approximately 15% of the trading days. The first thing to note is the size of the net trades. On days
11 See Prospectus 1999.
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where there is a net creation, the average size of the net creation is 1,395,430 shares. With prices in the
range of $50 to $120 per share, average creations are over $100 million. On days there are net
deletions, the average is 1,816,119 shares or a dollar deletion of over $150 million. There are daily
creations or deletions of over one $1 billion and many over $500 million. Clearly, creations and
deletions are being done by large institutions. There is a fixed cost of $3,000 per creation or deletion.
On a typical trade of 1,500,000 shares, this is a cost of  .2 cents a share. Creations are more common
than deletions. There were 158 days with net creations and only 67 with net deletions out of 1,497
trading days in our sample. This has meant that the number of Spiders has grown over time from
150,000 at inception to 131,670,000 on December 31, 1999.11
Who is doing the creations and deletions, and why? Discussion with market participants
indicates there are two groups: managed accounts (particularly index funds), and market makers.
Pension funds or institutional funds on occasion have large transfers. If an institutional fund gains a large
customer, it would like to be fully invested very quickly. It might well find it desirable to hold the index
and then adjust to a more active posture over time. It can construct an index fund by using futures and
money market instruments, it can buy Spiders, or buy company shares directly. Depending on the
relative prices, the best strategy may be to buy Spiders, turn them in for shares, and then over time
adjust the portfolio. Likewise, an institutional index fund which has lost a large customer might find it
cheaper to liquidate by turning in shares and selling the Spiders rather then selling the shares directly.
Although the use of futures is generally considered the cheapest way to adjust portfolios, many
12 It is an industry belief that at times there is such a dearth of shares available for
borrowing and shorting that there is a lot of money in Spider lending and the market maker will create
shares to profit from this.
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institutions or funds are prohibited from using futures and there are times where futures prices are very
different from their arbitrage value and Spiders are the cheapest instrument. 
Market makers and specialists seem to be the major creators and deletors. From trading
activities they may find themselves heavily long or short Spiders. The price and NAV may be divergent
and they may view that adjusting inventory may require trades so large in magnitude as to adversely
move prices, so that creation and deletion is cheaper.12
INSERT TABLE 5
III      Determinants of Volume
Before examining the determinants of volume, it is worthwhile examining volume directly. There
is heavy volume in Spiders relative to the outstanding supply. Table 6 shows the average daily volume
as a percentage of outstanding shares by year. In 1998 over 10% of the outstanding shares were traded
each day. Over the full period on 6% of the days over 25% of the outstanding shares were traded. This
heavy daily volume is an indication that short-term traders are active participants in the market.
Traditionally, trading volume of a security is thought to be generated by disagreements
associated with new information about the security and by liquidity traders. From the earlier discussion
it is clear that in the case of Spiders, volume is also heavily influenced by arbitrage and risk control
strategies. Short-term traders are likely to use Spiders to hedge their positions to control risk or for
13 Part of the appeal of Spiders for short-term trading strategies is that they can be short-
sold on a downtick while individual stocks cannot.
14 An alternative explanation for differences is stale prices. Stale prices should occur when
trading is low in the securities that comprise the S&P. We examined this by regressing differences in
price and NAV on NYSE volume and found no relationship.
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short-term speculation.13 In addition, Spider volume is likely to be affected by arbitrage strategies
involving differences in Spider price from NAV. What does this suggest about what factors affect
volume? First, market volatility is likely to be a reasonable proxy for times when Spider positions are
needed for risk control, and also a proxy for occasions when arbitrage opportunities are likely to exist.
We measure our first variable market volatility as the high price minus low price divided by the closing
price of the S&P Index.
Arbitrage opportunities in the Spider market are also likely to exist when there is a big
difference between price and NAV. To control for a time trend in volume and price, we express our
second variable as the absolute difference between price and NAV divided by price. Since price
differences from NAV are measured at the end of the day, difference should signal arbitrage
opportunities the next day so that this variable is lagged.14 In addition, since differences in either
direction indicate arbitrage opportunities, we use the absolute value.
In summary, the regression we ran was
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The results are reported in Table 7. Note, as speculated, the degree of price changes in the
market has a large and very highly significant effect on the amount of trading in Spiders. Spiders do
seem to be used for risk control and short-term trading strategies. In addition, when the absolute value
of the difference between price and NAV is high, arbitragers induce a lot of trading on the following
day. Note that the R2 is .52, indicating that we have found influences which explain better than 50% of
the changes in volume over time.  As shown in Table 7, Spider volume increases substantially in times
of high market volatility.  Futures serve the same hedging role as Spiders do.  The issue is in times of
turbulence which is the instrument of choice.  To examine this we regressed Spider volume divided by
future volume against the difference between the S&P high and the S&P low over the S&P close.  To
examine time trends we performed this regression each year.  The results are shown in Table 8.  Table
8 shows the growing choice of Spiders as a risk control instrument.  In 1993, if either instrument was
chosen, it was futures.  In the middle years, there was no relationship between market turbulence and
relative volume in Spiders compared to futures.  However, clearly in the last two years Spiders have
become the instrument of choice for managing short term risk.  Increased turbulence leads to substantial
increases in Spider volume relative to futures volume.
Although we do not report the results, we also tested whether volume was affected by a tax
postponement strategy and price discrepancies in the futures market. Spiders pay dividends about a
month after they go ex-dividend. For example, at the end of the year the Spider goes ex-dividend in
December but the dividend is not paid until January. This means that institutions that are on a cash basis
(such as most broker dealers) and have a fiscal year that ends in a month when the Spider goes ex-
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dividend can buy before the ex-dividend date and sell before the end of the fiscal year, and take the
dividend in the next year. This allows the institution to take the loss associated with the change in price
on the ex-dividend date in one year and a gain from receipt of the dividend in the next year, earning the
present value of the tax postponement.  To check on the possible impact of tax trades around ex-
dividend days on volume we put in a dummy for the ex-dividend day and the following day. These were
not significant.  We also examined several variables to see if volume in Spiders increased when futures
were priced very differently than their arbitrage value. None were significant.
INSERT TABLE 6, 7 & 8
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Conclusion
In this paper we examine the characteristics and performance of Spiders. The S&P 500 Spider
contract has become an important security in its own right, often being the most highly traded stock with
an average daily volume in December 1999 of 5.52 million shares. But the instrument is even more
important for its organizational form is widely discussed as a prototype for mutual funds of the future.
Spiders would seem to offer the benefits of both open- and closed-end mutual funds. The desirable
characteristics of Spiders is they trade at close to net asset value and like closed-end funds they offer
the ability to transact at market price at any point during the trading day. They avoid the disadvantages
of closed-end funds for which prices deviate widely from NAV and the disadvantage of open-end
funds of pricing only once a day, and in addition, often having restrictions or minimum limits on sales
and purchases.
The principal tool that restricts the deviation of price from NAV is the ability of investors to
create or delete Spiders at the end of every trading day by turning in or receiving the physical bundle of
securities that stand behind the Spider. When we examine differences in return based on the price of the
Spider and return based on its NAV, we find that the difference is less than 1.8 basis points per year on
average, and that almost all of the differences disappear within one day. In addition, we find that
the NAV of the Spider, measured before management fees and dividends on the underlying securities,
tracks the S&P Index almost exactly.
On the other hand, we show that the holder of a Spider earns a return 18 basis points below
the holder of the low cost index funds and below that of futures. Spiders underperform the S&P Index
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by 28.4 basis points. The two principal causes of the underperformance are the management fee of
18.45 basis points and the loss of return from dividend reinvestment of 9.95 basis points. The loss on
dividend reinvestment comes about because the trust form used for Spiders requires all dividends and
capital gains received by the Spider to be held in a non-interest-bearing account until paid out. It should
be pointed out that this disadvantage has been eliminated in most exchange traded funds (e.g. webs)
which were created subsequent to Spiders.
How can the different in return between Spiders and index funds exist? Why do people hold
Spiders rather an index funds? We believe the difference is the value investors place on immediacy.
Spiders are primarily used as a risk control mechanism and for short-term trading. Evidence of this is
easily seen by noting that trading in Spiders increases significantly in times of turbulent stock markets
(when prices move a lot).
Spiders also seem to offer a return lower than that which can be earned by holding short term
debt and futures. Here immediacy cannot account for the appeal of Spiders. But Spiders have the
advantage in that they can be bought and sold in much smaller units than futures, they do not require the
active management that futures require (e.g., margin maintenance), and physical delivery can be taken
(or supplied).
The success of Spiders would suggest that exchange-traded mutual funds are a viable
investment vehicle. Two of their principal disadvantages (inability to earn investment income on
dividends and capital gains, and the inability to earn income on security lending) have already been
eliminated in most of the second generation of exchange-traded funds. The management fees that
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Spiders charge have recently been decreased by a third. Despite their bugs, Spiders and other
exchange-traded funds which offer immediacy are likely to prosper and reproduce.
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Table 1 
The Annual Performance of Spiders Relative to the S&P 500 
This table shows the annual return from investing in Spiders relative to the return of the 
standard S&P 500 index and the CRSP value weighted S&P 500 index.  The returns are 
compared with and without dividends included.  NAV represents the return on the net 
asset value of the Spiders.  The standard index represents the return on the S&P 
Composite Price Index.   The CRSP S&P index is the value weighted return on the S&P 
index as constructed by CRSP.  The total shortfall represents the difference between the 
return from the S&P and the return on the NAV of the Spider with dividends taken into 
account.  This shortfall can be separated into two factors: 1) the difference between the 
NAV return without dividends and the S&P return without dividends and 2) the effect of 
management expenses and the lack of dividend reinvestment. 
 
Standard Index 
    
 With Dividends Without Dividends 
and Management Fee 
Shortfall in Performance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(2) – (3) 
(7) 
(4) –(5) 
(8) 
(6) – (7) 
 
Year 
 
NAV 
 
S&P 
 
NAV 
 
S&P Total
 
Tracking1 
Expenses and 
Dividends 
1993* 8.92 9.19 6.25 6.30 -0.27 -0.06 -0.21 
1994 1.15 1.32 -1.46 -1.53 -0.17 0.08 -0.25 
1995 37.20 37.56 34.12 34.11 -0.36 0.01 -0.37 
1996 22.72 22.97 20.26 20.26 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 
1997 33.06 33.4 31.03 31.01 -0.34 0.03 -0.37 
1998 28.28 28.57 26.64 26.67 -0.29 -0.03 -0.26 
Average 21.89 22.17 19.47 19.47 -0.28 0.00 -0.28 
  
CRSP S&P Index 
    
 With Dividends Without Dividends 
and Management Fee 
Shortfall in Performance 
 
Year 
 
NAV 
 
S&P 
 
NAV 
 
S&P Total
 
Tracking1 
Expenses and 
Dividends 
1993* 8.92 8.97 6.25 6.08 -0.05 0.16 -0.21 
1994 1.15 1.37 -1.46 -1.49 -0.22 0.03 -0.25 
1995 37.20 37.62 34.12 34.16 -0.42 -0.05 -0.37 
1996 22.72 23.28 20.26 20.57 -0.56 -0.31 -0.25 
1997 33.06 33.49 31.03 31.10 -0.43 -0.06 -0.37 
1998 28.28 28.99 26.64 27.08 -0.71 -0.44 -0.27 
Average 21.89 22.29 19.47 19.59 -0.40 -0.11 -0.29 
     
* partial year    
1 doesn’t equal difference in columns since calculations 
were carried to more decimals than reported in the table 
   
 
 
 
Table 2 
Regression of Spider and Index Fund Returns against the S&P 500 
This table shows the coefficient of the variable listed at the top of the column when the 
return of the independent variable is regressed against either the S&P index or the CRSP 
index and the second of these indexes is orthogonalized to the first. Only one R2 value is 
reported since the order of orthogonalization does not impact the overall goodness of fit. 
 
 
Panel     A 
Index Fund Returns Intercepts Standard S&P  R2 
 
 Coef. T Value Coef. T Value   
Spider -0.000 -2.341 0.998 2680.82  0.998  
Vanguard 0.000 0.1126 1.000 1035.68  0.999  
Fidelity -0.000 -0.592 1.002 558.11  0.995  
T Rowe Price -0.000 -0.401 1.001 326.83  0.986  
 
Panel     B 
Index Fund Returns Intercepts Standard S&P Orthogonalized  CRSP 
S&P 
R2 
 Coef. T  Value Coef. T  Value Coef. T Value  
Spider -0.000 -2.34 0.998 2680.64 0.008 0.893 1.000 
Vanguard 0.000 0.113 1.000 1038.98 0.079 3.244 0.999 
Fidelity -0.000 -0.5932 1.002 559.38 0.126 2.790 0.995 
T Rowe Price -0.000 -0.4009 1.000 326.87 0.090 1.163 0.986 
 
 
Panel     C 
Index Fund Returns Intercepts CRSP  S&P Orthogonalized  Standard
S&P 
 
 Coef. T  Value Coef. T  Value Coef. T  Value  
Spider -0.000 -4.375 1.002 2678.53 0.990 106.02   
Vanguard -0.000 -0.687 1.004 1038.78 0.922 38.20  
Fidelity -0.000 -1.028 1.006 559.04 0.876 19.52  
T Rowe Price -0.000 -0.653 1.005 326.65 0.911 11.87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 Excess Return on Spider over S&P as a Function of Reinvestment Return on Dividend  
The table below presents the difference between the Spider return and the return on the 
S&P index for six groups formed by ranking the 24 quarterly S&P returns form lowest to 
highest. 
 
 
 Group Spider Returns minus S&P index return 
(Quarterly Reinvestment in %) 
 
Lowest   1 0.020 
 2 -0.011 
 3 -0.028 
 4 -0.041 
 5 -0.062 
Highest 6 -0.109 
         
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Frequency Distribution of Spider Net Asset Value Versus Price 
This table reports the frequency distribution of 1) the difference between the net asset 
value of the Spider and the Spider price, and 2) the difference between the net asset value 
of the Spider and the Spider price as a proportion of the net asset value 
 
 
 NAV – Spider Price  NAV – Spider Price 
NAV 
Difference in 
Dollars 
Frequency Percentage Difference in 
Percentage 
Frequency Percentage 
-2.05 to –1.05 1 .001 -2.05 to –1.05 0 0 
-1.05 to –0.55 1 .001 -1.05 to –0.55 3 .002 
-0.55 to –0.45 4 .003 -0.55 to –0.45 6 .004 
-0.45 to –0.35 8 .005 -0.45 to –0.35 12 .008 
-0.35 to –0.25 23 .015 -0.35 to –0.25 47 .031 
-0.25 to –0.15 73 .049 -0.25 to –0.15 151 .101 
-0.15 to –0.05 255 .170 -0.15 to –0.05 260 .174 
-0.05 to 0.05 676 .452 -0.05 to 0.05 439 .293 
0.05 to 0.15 304 .203 0.05 to 0.15 312 .208 
0.15 to 0.25 79 .053 0.15 to 0.25 154 .103 
0.25 to 0.35 33 .022 0.25 to 0.35 56 .037 
0.35 to 0.45 19 .013 0.35 to 0.45 25 .017 
0.45 to 0.55 11 .007 0.45 to 0.55 15 .010 
0.55 to 1.05 10 .007 0.55 to 1.05 17 .011 
      
 Average = .014  Average = .018% 
 
Table 5 
The Creation and Deletion of Spider Units 
The table reports the frequency distribution of the number of days on which net creations 
and deletions of different sizes occurred over the sample period.  A negative sign 
indicates deletion.  A positive sign indicates creation.  Zero indicates neither creation nor 
deletion. 
 
 
Creations and Deletions 
(in thousands) 
Frequency Percentage Occurrence 
-4500 or larger deletion 4 0.27 
-4499 to -3000 7 0.47 
-2999 to -2000 18 1.20 
-1999 to -1500 8 0.53 
-1499 to -1000 12 0.80 
-999 to -500 13 0.87 
-499 to -50 5 0.33 
0 1271* 85.96 
50 to 499 11 0.73 
500 to 999 65 4.34 
1000 to 1499 27 1.80 
1500 to 1999 18 1.20 
2000 to 2999 25 1.67 
3000 to 3999 3 0.20 
4000 to 4999 6 0.40 
5000 or more 3 0.20 
   
Net Average Deletion =  -1836.119 
Net Average Creation = 1395.43 
 
* Creations and deletions can not occur in the range –49.9 to +49.9. 
   
   
 
 
 
Table 6 
Daily Volume As Percentage of Outstanding Shares 
This table shows the average annual daily volume as a percentage of outstanding shares 
of the Spider. 
 
Year Average Volume 
1993 4.53% 
1994 3.90% 
1995 2.67% 
1996 4.49% 
1997 8.53% 
1998 10.65% 
  
 
Table 7 
Explanations of Daily Spider Volume 
This table reports the results of the regression used to explain the daily trading volume of 
the Spiders.  The dependent variable is daily Spider volume.  The independent variables 
are 1) the intercept term, 2)  (SP500 intraday high – SP500 intraday low) / SP500 close, 
and 3) the absolute value of (Spider price – Spider NAV) / Spider price at time t-1.  
 
     
     
  
Intercept 
 
SP500 high – SP500 low 
SP500 close 
absolute value of 
(SPDR price – SPDR nav) 
SPDR price 
at time t-1 
 
  R2 
     
Coefficient -0.016 3.228 2.376 0.52 
Standard Deviation 0.001 0.085 0.506  
t-statistic -14.152 37.790 4.693  
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 8  
Regression of Relative Volume of Spider against Market Volatility 
This table reports the results of the regression used to explain the relative volume of 
Spider to volume of S&P500 index futures in times of pressure in the market. The 
regression is done annually. The independent variable is the ration of Spider volume over 
volume of S&P500 index futures (scaled by 1000). The independent variables are 1) the 
intercept term, 2)(S&P500 index intraday high-S&P500 index intraday low)/ S&P500 
index close. 
 
 
 
 Intercept SP500 high – SP500 low 
SP500 close R
2 
Year Coef. T Value Coef. T Value  
1993 0.00746 0.99 -0.34 -2.74 0.03 
1994 0.00478 4.59 0.13 1.15 0.00 
1995 0.00467 8.95 -0.03 -0.43 0.00 
1996 0.00846 8.74 0.34 3.98 0.06 
1997 0.01699 5.74 1.62 8.83 0.23 
1998 0.0416 14.49 1.25 8.06 0.20 
 
